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Abstract 
 
In this paper we argue conceptually and show empirically that the effect of
diversification on performance is not homogeneous across industries, as
previously assumed in the literature on diversification in strategy and
finance. Some industries may be more friendly environments for
diversified firms than for specialists, or vice versa. After replicating the
main findings in finance and strategy, we show that the number of
specialists in an industry is an important moderator of the diversification-
performance relationship, which determines the existence of a
diversification discount, a premium, or the curvilinear relationship
frequently found in strategy research. The results are robust to the use of
different specifications and control for the self-selection problem detected
by recent research on the diversification discount. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between diversification and firm performance has been the 
subject of abundant research in several fields, including Strategic Management, 
Industrial Organization, and Corporate Finance (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Palich, 
Cardinal, and Miller, 2000). The main focus in this literature has been the relative 
performance of diversifiers versus specialized firms (i.e. non diversifiers that operate 
only in one industry), typically analyzing empirically large samples that include a broad 
number of industries. However, despite the research accumulated in the last three 
decades, there is no widely accepted causal relationship between diversification and 
performance. Though most scholars would probably agree on a somewhat negative 
relationship between diversification and performance based on the empirical evidence 
of a diversification discount, probably an inverted-U relationship, recent research shows 
that the diversification discount disappears when we control for the possibility of self-
selection (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004a). 
 
In this paper, we will review some of the most recent developments, especially 
those investigating the self-selection problem and the data limitations studied in the 
finance literature in the last few years (Villalonga, 2004b), which once again question 
whether there is a diversification discount or indeed a premium. Anticipating our main 
argument, we will explain conceptually and provide empirical evidence that no 
relationship (either positive, negative, or even quadratic) should be expected between 
diversification and performance across all industries, as it has been typically tested. We 
will show that the actual relationship depends on the underlying nature of the industries 
and firms in the sample, even after taking into consideration the self-selection problem 
present in most of the accumulated research. Thus, to understand whether 
diversification leads to improved or worse performance for firms, we should probe 
deeper into the characteristics of the specific industries in which the firm is involved 
and, more specifically, the extent to which specialized firms or diversifiers have a 
competitive advantage when competing in a given industry or set of industries. 
 
We will argue that some industry characteristics may be more favorable for the 
relative performance of diversifiers than specialized firms, or vice versa. The previous 
literature has overlooked this possibility and it has focused in estimating an average 
effect of diversification on performance homogeneous across all industries, usually 
controlling for some measure of relatedness among the business units at the firm level. 
In this study, we investigate how the effect of diversification on performance indeed 
varies depending on the industries that we include in the sample and how this fact 
affects the interpretation of earlier literature on this topic. We will show that there is a 
diversification discount when the sample is comprised only by diversifiers competing 
against a relatively large number of specialized companies. In contrast, we find a 
diversification premium when the same estimation is done only in industries in which 
just a few specialized firms compete. Thus, no diversification premium or discount 
should be expected across the board. 
 
This argument will lead us to question the inverted-U relationship proposed by 
some researchers in strategy (Grant, Jammine, and Thomas, 1988; Palich, Cardinal, and 
Miller, 2000), or any other type of relationship, as valid across the board in all IE Working Paper                                   DE8-112-I                               20/12/2004 
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industries. We will argue that the effect diversification on performance depends on the 
relative strength of diversifiers versus specialists in the set of industries under 
consideration. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: First, we will review briefly the empirical 
research on the diversification-performance relationship in strategy and the 
diversification discount in finance. Then, we will use a simple statistical model to 
explain why we should not expect to find a constant relationship between diversification 
and performance across all industries. These ideas will be tested empirically through the 
analysis described in the following section. The fifth section shows the results of the 
analysis in which we replicated the methodologies traditionally used in each of the two 
fields, finance and strategy. In the last section, we present the conclusions from this 
study and suggest new ways to uncover the effect of diversification on firm 
performance. 
 
2. Empirical research on the effect of diversification on performance 
Since the early work of Rumelt (1974, 1982), most strategy scholars believe 
diversification eventually begins having a negative impact on firm performance, based 
on the notion of relatedness among the businesses in which a corporation competes. A 
recent meta-analysis of the literature finds evidence of this idea, supporting an inverted-
U relationship between diversification and performance, though several other functional 
relationships have been found in the literature (Palich, Cardinal, and Miller, 2000). The 
main rationale is that the first few diversification steps are closely related to the core 
competences of the organization, which allow for the transfer of competitive advantages 
and knowledge in particular. However, as the firm moves to other industries further 
away from the core, these possibilities disappear and performance should begin to 
suffer. This argument presumably applies across the board to all firms regardless of the 
initial industry in which they emerged. In other words, this is the average effect that has 
been detected, obtained usually from large databases of firms and industries. 
 
Empirical research in finance also shows that diversified firms seem to 
systematically perform worse than specialized firms. There is a large body of literature 
that has studied the so-called “diversification discount” in finance
1. Lang and Stulz 
(1994), and Berger and Ofek (1995) among others provide strong evidence that 
conglomerates trade at a discount compared to specialized companies. The 
interpretation of this empirical finding has been that “diversification destroys value”, 
fully consistent with strategy research. The results usually hold independently of the 
period of time, country, and financial performance measure used.  
 
More recently, however, Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004a) point 
out that firms do not randomly become diversified, but rather they endogenously choose 
to do so. They provide evidence that diversified firms traded at a discount prior to 
becoming diversified and, once they control for this self-selection, the diversification 
discount either disappears or becomes a diversification premium. In the same direction, 
Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) show that segments acquired by diversifying firms 
already traded at a discount before the acquisition, thus also refuting the post acquisition 
                                                 
1 See Martin and Sayrak (2003) for a recent survey. IE Working Paper                                    DE8-112-I                               20/12/2004 
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negative relationship between diversification and performance. Furthermore, Villalonga 
(2004b) using a unique database is able to build more precise measures of firm 
diversification, and she finds that the diversification discount turns into a premium. 
 
Despite being a central topic in the field of strategy and finance, the evidence 
about the effect of diversification on performance is still inconclusive. The most recent 
research in finance casts serious doubts into the existence of a diversification discount 
and the methodological limitations of the accumulated evidence. Thus, the question of 
whether diversification improves o worsens firm performance is still worthy of further 
research. However, it seems that the search for new types of general functional 
relationships between diversification and performance, presumably valid across all 
industries, has taken us as far as we could go. In the next section we will analyze 
statistically why we should not expect to find a functional relationship homogeneous 
across industries. We will argue that diversification may be good or bad depending on 
the industries that we are considering. We will show that, if this is true, then earlier 
research has estimated an “overall aggregated effect” of diversification on performance 
that may not be valid for the different subsamples of industries within the population of 
firms. In other words, we may have missed a critical moderator of the diversification-
performance relationship. 
 
3. Modeling the relationship between diversification and performance 
As we will see below more rigorously, earlier research has estimated the effect 
of diversification on performance as if it were homogeneous across all industries. 
However, it is very likely that being a specialist (or a diversifier) could give a 
competitive advantage in some industries, but not in others. For instance, specialists 
could be particularly competitive in a given industry if there are no economies of scope 
with other possible vertical or parallel activities. If there is a large number of specialists 
in such an industry, diversifiers would probably be at a disadvantage because of the 
greater bureaucracy costs of performing activities within the hierarchy that could be 
done more efficiently outside of it, assuming the lack of small numbers bargaining and 
the associated higher transaction costs. On the other hand, under the opposite 
circumstances diversifiers could have a competitive advantage over specialists. 
 
Let us assess formally the potential influence of introducing this type of 
heterogeneity across industries on the identifying assumptions of prior studies. Later, 
we will replicate the procedure used for the estimation of the diversification discount in 
finance, but taking into account that specialized firms may perform better or worse than 
diversifiers depending on the specific industry they are in. 
 
Variations around the following model have been used in the specifications by 
previous studies: 
itI It it it itI e K D X y + + + + = 3 2 1 0 δ δ δ δ  
where,    
yitI represents a measure of performance of segment i at time t operating in industry I. 
Xit represents observed firm characteristics of firm i at time t 
Dit is a dummy equal to one if firm i is a multi-segment company at time t (diversifier)   
KIt are industry characteristics, both observed and unobserved of industry I at time t 
eitI represents unobserved segment characteristics IE Working Paper                                    DE8-112-I                               20/12/2004 
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δ0 δ1 δ2 δ3 are the parameters to be estimated. In this literature, the coefficient of interest 
is δ2 that measures the effect of being diversified on firm performance. 
 
If a firm is diversified and operates in N industries, its performance, Yit,1..N , will 
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For non-diversified firms we have: 
(2)  itI It it itI itI e K X y Y + + + = = 3 1 0 δ δ δ  
 
The specification that in general the literature has followed
2 consists in first 
using the sample of non-diversified firms to find an average industry performance,  It y . 































+ + + =
= + + + = =
∑ ∑ ∑
δ δ δ
δ δ δ  










tI itI N it
v D X
e e D X X
y Y
+ + + =













) ( ) (
    (4)
δ δ δ











It itI it e e X v
1 1
1 ) ( ω ω δ
 
(4) is the equation that the traditional diversification discount literature has 
estimated using different measures of performance. The robust and consistent empirical 
finding across many different samples and time periods has been that δ2<0 and the 
interpretation has been that diversification destroys value. As a first caveat, note that 
this model can not be applied to diversified firms that operate in industries in which 
only diversified firms operate, since for them we are unable to construct  tI y . Therefore, 
this estimation procedure selectively eliminates from the sample those industries in 
which only diversified firms exist, arguably when they are most likely to perform better 
than specialized ones. However, we will ignore this problem for now and we will use 
the same estimation strategy to keep our study comparable to previous ones at this 
stage.  
 
The regression model as specified in (4) will give a consistent estimator of δ 
under the standard conditions that E[v/X] = E[v/D] = 0. However, the self-selection 
                                                 
2E.g. see Berger-Ofek (1995) as a highly influential paper in finance, used as reference point in our study. IE Working Paper                               DE8-112-I                          20/12/2004 
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discount literature (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004a) has shown why E[v/D] 
can be expected to be different from 0. In this case, unobservable firm characteristics 
that are correlated with performance measures will also be correlated with the decision 
to diversify. For example, it may happen that firms with more organizational capital are 
more productive and at the same time more likely to diversify (Schoar, 2002).  
 
This more recent branch of literature takes into account that Dit =1 iff Dit
* = 
Zit+µit> 0 and that either cov(Z,v)≠0 or cov(µ,v)≠0. Therefore, the identification of δ2 
relies on finding an instrument z that belongs to Z, but does not belong to X such that 
E[v/z]=0. The important finding of this recent literature in finance is that once we try to 
control for this endogeneity problem of self-selection, the diversification discount either 
disappears or becomes a diversification premium, as we noted earlier. 
 
Once we have stated the general model, we can discuss the implications of our 
previous analysis on the diversification discount literature are. We have seen that the 
effect of diversification on performance might vary across industries. We represent this 
fact by considering that  ∑ + =
I
I
iI Ind 2 2 2 δ δ δ  where as before “I” represents a given 
industry, IndiI is an indicator function equal to one if firm i is present in industry I and 
zero otherwise and 
I
2 δ  is a parameter different for every industry that represents how 
well diversified firms perform in that particular industry. Note that 
I
2 δ  could be positive 
or negative. After we have introduced this extension, the parameter of interest is still 
2 δ , this is, the average effect of diversification on performance across industries.  
If we rewrite the general model above taking this modification into account we 
get: 
(5) it it it
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where the only difference with respect to (4) is the inclusion of an extra error 








This modification has important consequences in understanding the previous 
literature. For the traditional diversification discount literature, even in E[v/D] = 0 now 
E[v




















2 δ ω , which could be larger or smaller than zero. 
However,  ωI (segment share of sales or assets) is probably going to be larger for 
industries in which 
I
2 δ >0, since companies are likely to allocate more resources to those 
industries or segments in which they are more productive (Maksimovic and Phillips, 
                                                 
3 Note that since ωI is equal to zero if the firm is not active in industry I the indicator function is 
redundant. 
4 Note also that now the diversification decision should be modeled slightly differently in the following 
way: Dit =1 iff there are at least two industries I,J such that ZitIJ +µitIJ> ZitI +µitI and ZitIJ+µitIJ>ZitJ.+µitJ 
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2 δ ω ]> 0 and the usual diversification discount 
regressions would likely be an upward biased estimator of the average effect of 
diversification on performance, if we abstract from the self-selection issue, as the ones 
in Berger and Ofek (1995) or Lang and Stulz (1994). The fact that this literature still 
finds a significant diversification discount means that the negative effect identified by 







2 δ ω ] in (5). Furthermore, as we will discuss in the next section, the 
procedure followed to construct the industry adjusted measures of performance could 
downward bias the estimation of  2 δ . 
 
Note that if the effect of diversification indeed varies across industries, the 
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E[k/D=1] ≠0, because E[k/D=1] ≠0. Intuitively, unless we take into account that the 
effect of diversification on performance varies across industries, any instrument that is 
correlated with the decision to diversify will also be correlated with the regression error 
in (5) since it includes the diversification dummy.  
 
What is the sign of this bias? This will depend on the sign of E[k/D=1]. For the 
case of the estimation strategy followed in Campa and Kedia (2002), they use the set of 
instruments that measures attractiveness of the industry for conglomerates, like 
proportion of industry activity accounted by diversified firms. If this is the case, 
E[k/D=1] > 0 and therefore the instrumental variable estimator will be an upward biased 
estimator of  2 δ .  
 
Given the important consequences of not taking into consideration the likelihood 
that the effect of diversification on performance varies across industries, let us study 
empirically how the relationship between diversification and performance would change 




We want to analyze empirically the performance-diversification relationship 
taking into account that the effect of diversification on performance may vary across 
industries, but obviously we do not know a priori in which particular industries the 
performance of diversified firms will be better or worse than the performance of 
specialized companies. However, we could argue that the performance of diversified 
firms should be relatively lower in those industries in which there is greater competition 
from a larger number of non-diversified companies, in contrast to industries where there 
are only a few specialists.  
 
This seems reasonable from an evolutionary perspective and a transaction cost 
approach as well. First, if specialists are more competitive in a given industry, we 
should observe a larger number of them in it. Second, any potential transaction between 
two divisions of a diversified firm has typically the alternative to be carried out through IE Working Paper                                DE8-112-I                               20/12/2004 
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the market, but markets provide a better allocation of resources only if there are a 
sufficiently large number of participants that inhibits small numbers bargaining. Thus, 
diversification into an industry with a large number of specialists is likely to have a 
negative effect in firm performance, because it provides no advantage to a diversified 
firm, which in addition needs to absorb the greater bureaucracy costs that specialists 
does not suffer. 
 
Before we test this possibility directly, we will first replicate the Berger and 
Ofek (1995) regression analysis taking both firm and segment information from 
Compustat for the period 1993-2001, for which we had available data. Table I shows 
the descriptive statistics. We follow exactly the same procedure that they followed to 
construct our sample (financial firms in SIC 6000 through 7000, and firms with sales 
less than $20 million were excluded), but we introduce one critical difference: Berger 
and Ofek (1995) exclude from their study all industries in which there are not at least 
five specialized firms active. We do not use this restriction because, as explained earlier, 
we do not want to limit the sample and leave out industries where there are very few 
specialized companies. These firms constitute about 12% of the total sample, where 
diversifiers probably have greater advantage over specialists. As explained in the 
previous section, leaving out these firms would bias the results, if there is an interaction 
of diversification with the number of specialized firms active in each industry. 
 
For financial performance, we will use the same measure as in the previous 
literature on diversification: industry-adjusted market to book ratio, following the same 
steps than Berger and Ofek (1995). For every firm in the sample, we first compute its 
market value by multiplying the stock price at the end of the year by the number of 
outstanding shares and adding the book value of short and long-term debt. We also 
compute a representative industry market to book ratio as the median of the market to 
book ratio of companies operate exclusively in each four-digit SIC industry. Then, for 
every firm we compute a “would be” market to book ratio averaging the representative 
industry market to book using the representative industry ratios in which the firm is 
active and using as relative weights the percentage of segment assets over total assets of 
the company. Finally, the industry-adjusted market to book ratio is computed as the 
natural log of the real company market to book ratio divided by the “would be” market 
to book ratio estimated before. 
 
In our last analysis, we conducted further subsample analysis to test the 
curvilinear relationship between diversification and performance following the 
methodology frequently used in strategy. It should be noted that for this last analysis we 
used a continuous measure of diversification, an entropy index computed as: 
∑Pi*log(1/Pi) where P is firm sales in a given four digit SIC code over total firm sales 
(Palepu, 1985). In contrast, we used a dummy variable to identify the firms that are 
diversified in the earlier analysis. Thus, in each analysis we use the traditional way in 
which diversification has been measured in the studies of diversification in finance and 
strategy. We followed this operationalization of diversification consistent with the 
model in the previous section in order to make possible the comparison with the 
relevant literature in each case. 
 
To check the robustness of the results to other performance measures and time, 
the analysis was also done using industry-adjusted market to sales ratios as a measure of 
performance, and very similar results were obtained. In addition, the analysis was IE Working Paper                              DE8-112-I                               20/12/2004 
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replicated using data only for the most recent year that we had 2001, again obtaining 
virtually identical results. Given the large number of firms and small number of years, 
we considered more appropriate this pooled model and control for each firm, as it is 
typically done in the studies of the diversification discount, instead of reporting the 
results only for the last year 2001 or adjust the error term for serial correlation 
(introducing the potential for bias). These additional analyses were not included in this 
short version of the paper, but they are available from the authors upon request. 
 
5. Results 
First, we will replicate the landmark study of Berger and Ofek (1995) in finance 
about the diversification discount. To make possible the comparison, we conducted the 
analysis in two subsamples: one with industries with at least five specialized companies 
(like in Berger and Ofek, 1995) and another with less than five specialized companies 
(which were excluded in the Berger and Ofek study). With these analyses we want to 
test whether indeed the effect of diversification on performance depends on which sub-
sample of industries we are considering. After this, we directly test the general model 
(5) above, introducing the additional term that captures the interaction of the 
diversification variable with the number of specialized firms active in the industry. 
 
Table II shows the estimation of the effect of diversification on performance 
using the same specification as in Berger and Offek (1995). The results vary 
substantially depending on the type of industries included in the sample. If we consider 
only those industries in which there are more than four specialised companies, as is 
typically done in the studies of the diversification-performance relationship in finance, 
we find the usual negative effect of diversification on performance, fully consistent with 
the results of Berger and Ofek (1995). However, if we estimate the effect of 
diversification on performance only in industries in which there are less than five 
specialised companies, we find a significant diversification premium. Finally, if we 
consider all industries without any constraints in the sample, the effect of diversification 
on the destruction of value are similar in nature to this latter subsample analysis, but 
substantially less strong
5. Thus, the frequently observed negative relationship between 
diversification and performance does not occur in industries where there are relatively 
fewer specialists, and diversifiers clearly dominate over specialists. The effect of 
diversification on performance seems to be moderated by the industries that we are 
considering, more specifically the number of specialists in each industry. 
                                                 
5 The results for the full sample can be considered mixed. Though we obtained a significant 
negative coefficient (0.02) for the diversification indicator in the full sample for the 1993-3001 period 
using industry-adjusted market to book ratio as the dependent variable as shown in Table II, the additional 
analysis for the last year 2001 period (not shown) provided an insignificant result for this coefficient. 
Furthermore, the analyses the period 1993-2001 and also the last year 2001 (not shown) using now 
adjusted market to sales ratio as a measure of performance obtained a significant negative coefficient in 
both cases. In contrast to the full sample analysis mentioned in this footnote, the results were always the 
same for the different specifications used for the dependent variable and time frame in each of the two 
subsamples. In our opinion, these inconclusive results for the full sample analysis using another measure 
of performance and time frame provide additional support that the nature of the diversification-
performance relationship is not constant across industries and it should be computed and interpreted 
across a subset of industries, taking into consideration their intrinsic structural characteristics (particularly 
the number of specialists in the industry) and how they may affect the competitiveness of diversifiers 
versus specialists in such setting.  
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Next, we directly introduce in the regression an interaction of the diversification 
dummy with the number of specialized competitors in the industry. In terms of the 
model described in (5) we hypothesize  ) log( 2 I
I c θ δ = ; where θ is a parameter to be 
estimated and cI is the number of specialized companies active in industry I. We use a 
logarithmic function since we suspect that an increase in the number of specialized 
companies has a larger influence on the performance of diversified firms when there are 
just a few of them in the industry. With this functional form for 
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and therefore we proceed to estimate (6), that is, the standard regressions in 
Berger and Ofek (1995), plus the additional term  ∑
I
I itI it c D log ω , an interaction term of 
the dummy for diversification with the weighted average of the number of specialized 
competitors by industry. 
 
Table III shows the results of this regression. The main effect of diversification 
(common across industries) is positive for the two models. More important, however, 
the interaction of the diversification dummy with the weighted average of the number of 
specialized companies is negative and strongly statistically significant. This is an 
additional piece of evidence that the effect of diversification on performance depends 
crucially on the industry characteristics in which the diversified firms operate. There is a 
significant interaction between diversification and the number of specialized firms in 
the industry, which can be considered a proxy for the relative competitiveness of 
specialized firms (versus diversifiers). As usual, both main effect and interaction need to 
be taken into consideration to understand the diversification-performance relationship. 
The overall effect of diversification on performance is positive for industries in which 
there less than three specialists. For these industries the main positive effect (.26) 
dominates over the interaction effect (-.10); however, when there are more than three 
specialists in the industry in which the firm is competing, the negative interaction effect 
begins to dominate. Because most research in the diversification discount in finance 
excludes firms in these industries with very few specialists, it seriously undermines the 
results because it drops those cases where diversifiers are relatively more competitive. 
 
However, our findings may suffer from the self-selection problem, because 
firms do not randomly become diversified or specialized, as we discussed earlier. There 
might be unobserved firm characteristics correlated at the same time with the 
diversification decision and performance, which may be driving the correlation between 
diversification and performance. We now replicate our analysis taking into account this 
possibility. Different specifications have been used to correct for this problem of 
endogeneity, for instance by Villalonga (2004a) or Campa and Kedia (2002). In our 
study, we chose a fixed-effect regression that includes firm dummies, following the 
Campa and Kedia (2002) paper. Since we are only interested in firms that actually 
changed their diversification to assess its relationship with performance (controlling for 
any firm-level unobservable factors), we use only those firms in Compustat that report a 
change in the number of segments for the period 1993-2001.  
 
The results are depicted in Table IV. Once we control for unobserved firm 
characteristics as in Campa and Kedia (2002) using a dummy for every firm in the IE Working Paper                                DE8-112-I                               20/12/2004 
  10
sample, we find similar results to the analysis above. We still find a significant 
interaction between diversification and performance, so that diversification in industries 
with a large number of specialized competitors affects negatively performance ratios 
(though not when there are few specialized firms in the industry). These coefficients are 
smaller than those in Table III, but they show that diversification is positively 
associated to performance in industries when only a few specialists firms compete 
(diversifiers are stronger in these industries), and the relationship becomes negative in 
industries where there are a relatively larger number of specialists (approximately four 
or more specialists). The analysis in Table III shows that this is so even after taking into 
account the endogeneity problem of the diversification decision, because the main and 
interaction effects of diversification have the appropriate sign and significance after 
controlling for the intrinsic characteristics of each firm through a fixed-effects 
regression. 
 
The analysis provides very clear evidence that the relationship between 
diversification and performance depends on the nature of the industries in which this 
relationship is estimated. We should not expect any diversification premium or discount 
across the board in all industries, but it depends on the number of specialists in the 
industry, which moderates the diversification-performance relationship. When 
industries where only a few specialists compete are dropped from the analysis, as it is 
typically done in finance studies, we observe a diversification discount; however, we 
can see a diversification premium in these industries usually left out from empirical 
analysis.  
 
This finding should also affect the inverted-U shape relationship widely 
accepted in the field of strategy
6. If the diversification-performance relationship is not 
constant across all industries, the curvilinear relationship may just reflect the actual 
combination of industries in the sample, probably with different types of diversification-
performance association in different types of industries, but not a constant relationship 
with a common underlying cause across all industries. To test this possibility, we 
estimated a quadratic model of industry-adjusted ROA for each firm using an entropy 
measure of diversification (Palepu, 1985) as the independent variable of interest.  
 
The results are shown in Table V. For the full sample we obtained clear 
evidence in favor of the inverted-U relationship, being both the linear and the quadratic 
coefficients highly significant, consistent with earlier research in strategy. However, in 
line with the rest of the analysis and our main argument, this relationship does not hold 
in any of the two subsamples separately. Diversification has a significant linear positive 
effect for the subsample of industries with few specialized companies and it has an 
insignificant negative coefficient for the subsample with five or more specialized firms. 
The quadratic relationship seems to be the result of combining industries with different 
characteristics in which a different diversification-performance relationship seems to 




                                                 
6 For the accumulated evidence about the diversification-performance relationship, including different 




In this paper we analyzed theoretically and empirically why the effect of 
diversification on performance depends on the industries that we are considering. 
Basically, we have provided evidence that in industries where we observe less than five 
specialists (presumable where being a specialist is a clear disadvantage), the more 
diversified firms have higher performance. However, in industries in which specialists 
have greater presence (i.e. at least five specialists), more diversification is associated 
with lower performance. Thus, no homogeneous relationship between diversification 
and performance exists across all industries, being the number of specialists an 
important moderator of the relationship. 
 
The model in section 3 explains why we could expect an interaction between 
diversification and the number of specialists, and the implications that this may have in 
the estimation of the diversification-performance relationship. Earlier research in 
finance and strategy has not taken into consideration the possibility that diversification 
within a specific set of industries may have positive consequences for performance, but 
negative consequences for another set of industries. Maybe for this reason we have 
found conflicting results in the strategy literature, and scholars in the field of finance 
still debate the question of whether there is a diversification premium or a discount. 
 
In our opinion, the answer to this question is: It depends on the industries 
considered. We believe that the functional relationships estimated across large databases 
in many industries are an over-simplification of the effect of diversification on 
performance. Diversification may increase o decrease the performance of organizations 
depending on a variety of factors, of which only relatedness had been the focus of 
interest until now. However, the characteristics of the industries involved, like the 
number of specialists in them, also moderate the diversification-performance 
relationship. In certain industries (with very few specialists left) being a conglomerate 
could actually improve performance, but as the number of specialists increases in the 
industry, being more diversified is associated with lower performance. We prove this 
result robust to the use of different econometric specifications, including procedures that 
control for self-selection bias, and using the traditional methodologies in the fields of 
strategy and finance. 
 
In this paper we have shown that some industries may be more friendly 
environments for diversified firms than for specialists, which has important implications 
for the diversification literature. Ignoring this fact can bias the estimation of a general 
influence of diversification on firm financial performance. In fact, we have shown that 
the curvilinear relationship between diversification and performance holds only for the 
entire sample, but not in any of the two subsamples in which we split the dataset based 
on the number of specialists.  
 
This finding calls for a re-assessment of the literature on diversification. Further 
research is necessary to study why sometimes the diversification-performance 
relationship is positive, others negative, and often quadratic. We have found one 
explanation: the relationship is contingent on the industries considered. Thus, we can 
say now based on these results that it is not a question of finding the right functional IE Working Paper                               DE8-112-I                                20/12/2004 
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form, but in fact different relationships exist depending on the industries included in the 
study and the relative competitiveness of specialists versus diversifiers in them.  
 
However, we need to probe further into why certain industries are more friendly 
contexts for specialists and others for diversifiers. We have argued that small numbers 
bargaining and transactions costs in general may be part of the answer, but we have not 
tested directly why sometimes specialists dominate over diversifiers in a given set of 
industries or vice versa. Maybe industries dominated by specialists require very 
different kinds of knowledge or dominant logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) than those 
dominated by diversifiers. Future research should address this issue and revive this 
stream of research from a fresh perspective beyond a general effect of diversification on 
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TABLE I: Descriptive Statistics, 1993-2001 
 
 Mean  Std  Observations 
Industry adjusted market to book  0.05  0.54  24,330 
Assets (in millions of dollars)  1394.8  5638  24,330 
Cap. Expenditures over sales ratio  0.12  0.30  23,927 
EBIT over sales ratio  0.10  0.28  24,242 
Number of specialized firms
i  2.85 1.21  24.330 
Diversification Index 
ii  0.12 0.30  24,215 
 
i This variable measures the natural logarithm total number of specialized (non-
diversified) companies active in a given four digit SIC code. For diversified companies 
that operate in multiple industries this variable is computed as a weighted average of the 
natural logarithm of the total number of specialized competitors in each of the industries 
in which the diversified firm is active. The weights used are segment sales over total 
sales 
 
iiThis variable is constructed as ∑Pi*log(1/Pi) where P is firm sales in a given four digit 
SIC code over total firm sales (Palepu, 1985). IE Working Paper                                  DE8-112-I                                20/12/2004 
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TABLE II: Regression analysis in different subsamples: 1993-2001. Dependent 






















1Dummy equal to one if the firm operates in more than one segment. 
 
Replication of the Berger and Ofek (1995) regression analysis, including also industries 
with less than five specialists. 
 
 Subsample  of 
industries with 









































































2  0.03 0.04  0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 
N 2,916  2,860  19,438  19,064  24,330  23,854 IE Working Paper                                 DE8-112-I                                20/12/2004 
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Number of specialized firms *  







Log of assets    0.01
*** 
(0.00) 
Cap. Expenditures/Sales    0.01
* 
(0.01) 




2  0.00 0.01 




Regressions computed as in Berger-Ofek (1995) for the 1993-2001 period, but 
controlling now for the number of specialized firm and including its interaction with 
diversification. Full sample analysis. 




TABLE IV: Regression analysis controlling by weighted average of number of 




























Number of specialized firms *  







Log of assets    -0.12
*** 
(0.01) 
Capital Expenditures/Sales    0.04 
(0.03) 




2  0.53 0.55 
N 4,571  4,447 
 
 
Regressions computed as in Berger-Ofek (1995) and fixed-effects as in Campa and 
Kedia (2002). We use only observations from 778 firms that report a change in the 
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TABLE V:  Performance regressions in different subsamples. Dependent variable 
























Test of a curvilinear effect of diversification on performance across subsamples. 
 
 
i This variable is constructed as entropy index ∑Pi*log(1/Pi) where P is firm sales in a 
given four digit SIC code over total firm sales (Palepu, 1985). 
 
 Subsample  of 
industries with 


























































2  0.02 0.03  0.04 
N 3,671  18,208  23,826 